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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OP UTAH
JOHN T. BALLE, an Individual,
ALISHA BALLE, AMBER BALLE, and
JOHN T. BALLE as the parent
and general guardian of AMIE
BALLE, ASHLEE BALLE, ANDREA
BALLE,
ANJALEE
BALLE,
and
AMANDA BALLE, minor children,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,
Case No. 940480-CA

v.
BRYCE THOMAS, QUINN
and KEVIN ROSEMAN,

ERICKSON

Priority 15

Defendants/Respondents.

ON APPEAL FROM AN ORDER OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ISSUED BY THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH,
HONORABLE RAY M, HARDING, JUDGE.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT KEVIN ROSEMAN
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction

in this matter

is proper pursuant

to

Utah

Code

Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(k).
ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issue presented is as follows:
Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment in this
matter

based

upon

its

interpretation

of

Utah

Code

§41-6-38 and the uncontroverted evidence presented?

Annotated

In reviewing the trial court's ruling on a summary judgment
motion, this Court reviews the matter for correctness.
States Tel, & Tel.

Co, v. Garfield

Mountain

County, 811 P,2d 184 (Utah

1991) .
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
This matter is

governed by Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-38:

TITLE 41. MOTOR VEHICLES
CHAPTER 6. TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULATIONS
ARTICLE 4 ACCIDENTS
Sec, 41-6-38.
Livestock on
Collision, action for damages

highway—Restrictions—

(1) A person owning or in possession or control of any
livestock, may not willfully or negligently permit any of
the livestock to stray or remain unaccompanied by a
person in charge or control of the livestock upon a
highway, both sides of which are adjoined by property
which is separated from the highway by a fence, wall,
hedge, sidewalk, curb, lawn, or building.
This
subsection does not apply to range stock drifting onto
any highway in going to or returning from their
accustomed ranges.
(2) A person may not drive any livestock upon, over, or
across any highway during the period from half an hour
after sunset to half an hour before sunrise, without
keeping a sufficient number of herders with warning
lights on continual duty to open the road to permit the
passage of vehicles.
(3) In any civil action brought by the owner, operator,
or occupant of a motor vehicle or by their personal
representatives or assignees, or by the owner of the
livestock for damages caused by collision with any
domestic animal or animals on a highway, there is no
presumption that the collision was due to negligence on
behalf of the owner or the person in possession of
livestock.
As last amended by Chapter 138, Laws of Utah 1987.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In Summary, the Appellants fail in three areas;

they fail to

cite relevant legal precedent defining the scope of duty owed to
the public by the owner of livestock and they fail to direct the
Court f s attention to the binding precedent.
Secondly, Appellants claim a dispute of facts and rely upon
the testimony of a witness that was not previously presented to the
Court.
Lastly,

the

owner

or

possessor

of

livestock

must

have

contributed to the animal's presence there in a tangible and direct
way to be liable for damage resulting from their presence on a
highway, appellants fail to present evidence which would support
this conclusion in the trial court.

ARGUMENT
THIS APPEAL IS NOT WELL TAKEN BECAUSE APPELLANT
HAS FAILED TO CITE THE RELEVANT LEGAL PRECEDENT
Appellant has failed to cite the relevant legal precedent to
the Court in defining the scope of the duty owed to the public by
the owner of livestock.

Appellant does note the existence of Utah

Code Annotated 41-6-38, but fails to direct the Court's attention
to the binding precedent which interprets this statute.
The Utah Supreme Court held, in Rhiness v. Dansie, 472 P. 2d
428 (Utah 1970) , that the mere fact that an animal had escaped from
its enclosure and was on the highway was not sufficient to show
negligence on the part of the owner of the animal.

The Court again

upheld this interpretation of Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-38(3) and
Salt Lake County Ordinance § 10-10-3 to mean that specific acts of
the individual, directly allowing, sanctioning or encouraging the
animal to be in the road were required
Presiding Bishop, 758 P.2d

929

in Hornsbv v. Corp of

(Utah 1988),

(adopting

rule of

Santanello v. Cooper, 475 P.2d 246 (Ariz. 1970)).
Appellants did not present evidence that Roseman sanctioned
the presence of the horse on the highway.

The uncontroverted

evidence showed that the events complained of took place without
his knowledge or presence, but in his absence.

The testimony by

both Roseman and Defendant Erickson, submitted to the trial court
pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56, was uncontroverted by
Plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs failed to show facts that would raise

a

issue

material

as

to

whether

3

or

not

Defendant

Roseman

specifically allowed and sanctioned the presence of his horse on
the highway, as defined by the Supreme Court in these cases.
Plaintiffs presented opinion testimony that the latch securing
the gate on the Erickson property was defective in design, allowing
a

clever

enough

horse to

open the

gate by

use

of

hindquarters, or other part of the body. (R203-202)

its head,
Respondent

Roseman asked the Court to assume arguendo that this theory was
true, and view the facts and inferences to be drawn therefrom in
the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, maintaining that this
did not make out even a prima facie case against Roseman.

The

owner of the property is generally responsible for its condition,
unless this is modified

in some way.

Here, the only possible

modification that may have existed is the lease executed by Roseman
and

Erickson

on May

7, 1989.

(R217)

This

lease

determines

Roseman's affirmative duties in this agreement:
11

1.

He is to furnish feed when needed

2.

Maintain fence gate11

This agreement does not place Roseman under a duty to improve the
property in any way, only to repair breakage or wear and tear.
Applying the plain meaning test to the word "maintain", it is not
possible to read into it a duty to make improvements.

Black f s Law

Dictionary defines the word "maintain" as follows:
Maintain.
The term is variously defined as acts of
repairs and other acts to prevent a decline, lapse or
cessation from existing state or condition; bear the
expense of; carry on; commence; continue; furnish means
for subsistence or existence of; hold; hold or keep in an
existing state or condition; hold or preserve in any
particular state or condition; keep from change; keep
from falling, declining or ceasing; keep in existence or
4

continuance; keep in force; keep in good order; keep in
proper condition; keep in repair;
keep up; preserve;
preserve from lapse, decline failure or cessation;
provide for; rebuild; repair; replace; supply with means
of support; supply with what is needed; support;
sustain; uphold. Negatively stated, it is defined as not
to lose or surrender, not to suffer to fail or decline.
Under the plain terms of the agreement, Roseman was under a duty to
keep the fence and gate in the same condition as he found them, to
preserve them from decay.
the responsibility

Any underlying design defect would be

of the latch's designer

and builder

and/or

owner.

Mr. Roseman was not the designer, builder or owner of said

latch.

Therefore, no legal basis was presented upon which the

plaintiffs could have prevailed.

Snyder v. Merkley, 693 P. 2d 64

(Utah 1984) . Summary Judgment was properly granted in this matter.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPER IN THIS MATTER
BECAUSE THERE IS NO DISPUTE AS TO FACTS.
Appellants claim a dispute of facts, relying apparently upon
the testimony of a witness that was not presented to the Court
below.

Appellants properly direct this Court's attention to Rule

56(e), which states that affidavits are only required when a party
is claiming disputes of fact.

Specifically, the Rule states:

When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported
as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest
upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but
his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in
this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial.
URCP 56(e)
This Court may not consider evidence not presented
matter below.
1994);

in the

Finlayson v. Finlayson, 874 P. 2d 843, 847 (Utah App.

Low v. Bonacci, 788 P.2d 512, 513 (Utah 1990);

LeBaron &

Assoc, v. Rebel Enters., Inc., 823 P.2d 479, 483 (Utah App. 1991);
5

Salt Lake County v. Carlston, 776 P.2d 653, 655 (Utah App. 1989).
A statement by counsel that a factual issue exists, unsupported by
affidavit or other evidence, does not create an issue of fact.

D&L

Supply v. Saurini, 775 P.2d 420 (Utah 1989); Bradshaw v. Beaver
City, 27 Utah 2d 135, 493 P.2d 643 (1972).

Appellants are now

attempting to bolster their case after the fact with evidence not
presented at the trial court, in clear violation of Utah law.
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY INTERPRETED UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
§ 41-6-38 GIVEN THE FACTS PRESENTED
Under Utah Law, for an owner or possessor of livestock to be
liable for damage resulting from their presence on a highway, the
owner must have contributed to the animal's presence there in a
tangible and direct way.

Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-38; see e.g.

Hornsby v. Corp. of Presiding Bishop, supra;

Lee v. Mitchell

Funeral Home Ambulance Service, 606 P.2d 259 (Utah 1980);
v. Dansie, supra;

Rhiness

Hvrum Smith Estate Co. v. Petersen, 227 F.2d

4421 (10th Cir 1955) . Appellants failed to produce any evidence of
any negligent acts on the part of Defendant Roseman,but rested on
a theory of negligent omissions, which is contrary to Utah law.
Appellants have also failed to cite any of the precedent setting
cases in this area, ignoring the binding precedent that applies to
cases involving collisions with livestock.
With no duty imposed under these circumstances by the general
law, we next should examine whether Respondent assumed any higher
duty.

This duty would need to come from the arrangements between

Defendants Roseman and Erickson.

Under the terms of the pasturing

agreement, Defendant Roseman was obligated to maintain the fences
6

and

gates

in the

condition

pasturing his animal(s) there.

that

they

were

in when

he

began

He was not under any obligation to

improve the property, and the owner, Defendant Quinn Erickson, was
responsible for the original construction and any improvements. It
was uncontested that fence was maintained adequately, and it has
been alleged by Plaintiffs that the horse used the gate to leave
the pasture.

Appellants failed to show a breach of any duty to

either the appellants or to Defendant Erickson in this case which
properly was dismissed on a Motion for Summary Judgment.
This case is governed by the law established
cited statute and cases.

in the above

The rule explicitly set forth in these

cases, is that the term "permit11 means that the owner must directly
allow, sanction or encourage the animal to be in the road, with the
owner's knowledge and consent.

See Hornsby, 758 P. 2d 929 at 935

(specifically adopting the interpretation in Santanello v. Cooper,
475 P.2d 246 (Ariz. 1970).
The Supreme Court was clear when it stated the law.

Rhiness

v. Dansie. 472 P.2d 428 at 429-430.:
"In order for the plaintiffs to recover in this
action, they must show two things:
First, that the
highway was fenced on both sides; and second that the
horses got onto the highway through the negligence of the
defendant . The mere fact that the animals escaped from
the enclosure is not sufficient evidence, standing alone,
to justify the submission of defendant's negligence to
the jury.
The facts here are nearly identical to those in Rhiness.
Appellants

have

stated

that

a horse was

therefore, the enclosure was negligent.

on the

Here, The

highway,

and

There is no record of any

animal escaping from the subject enclosure before this incident.
7

(R202)

Appellants, relying upon argument made by their counsel

for the first time at oral argument in this matter, unsupported by
Affidavits, have attempted to raise an issue of fact at this time.
(R 289)

This

considered.

assertion

is not

evidence

and

should

not be

Even if this Court considers that a neighbor of Mr.

Erickson's once returned a horse to the property, this still does
not show affirmative acts of negligence on Mr. Roseman's part.
Appellants asserted below that Defendant Roseman was negligent
in boarding his horse in a pasture with only a latch to secure the
gate.

That position was correctly rejected as not supported by

Utah law.

Rhiness, supra.

Respondent

Roseman

agreed

to

maintain

the

property

in

question, and it was uncontested at the time of summary judgment
that the property did not deteriorate during the time of the lease.
Plaintiffs1

expert

sufficiently.

stated

that

the

fences

had

been

repaired

Respondent Roseman fulfilled his duties under the

lease, and any claims that the latch was "woefully insufficient11
should be made against the designer and builder of the latch,
Defendant Erickson.

All that has been presented in this case has

been speculative opinions unsupported by factual evidence. (R212198)
There was no evidence presented that the gate was open the
night of the accident.

Appellants1 expert stated that the gate

would fall open, if not properly latched.

(R 203)

However, this

would indicate, at most, that the last person to close the gate may
not have secured it properly, or that the gate was not secured
8

properly.

There is no evidence that the halter, or body part of

the horse, came into contact with the latch.

(R 2 02)

There are no witnesses, evidence or other facts to support
Johnson's opinion.

(R 202) All that Johnson actually observed was

that if the gate was not properly closed, it could fall open.
(R203-202)
These unsupported
negligence.

opinions do not

amount

to a charge of

There is no duty under Utah law to devise a self-

latching, self-locking apparatus on a pasture gate.
hold a gate closed if not properly secured.

No latch will

It may be true that

the last person to leave the pasture should be careful to secure
the gate, but Appellants provided no evidence as to that person's
identity.

It was undisputed at the time of summary judgment that

it was possible that someone could have opened the gate without
Defendant Erickson's knowledge.

If this could be done without the

resident of the property knowing, it would seem even more likely
that it could happen without the knowledge of an absent party,
Respondent Roseman.

Appellants

failed at the time of summary

judgment to show any dispute as to the facts, and failed to show
any

facts

supporting

a

finding

of

negligence

on the

part

of

Defendant Roseman.
CONCLUSION
Summary

Judgment

was

properly

granted

in

this

matter.

Appellants have attempted to raise issues of contested

fact by

presenting evidence not given to the trial Court.

Under the facts

presented,

facie

Appellants

failed

to
9

make

a

prima

case

of

negligence as specifically stated in Utah law, specifically, they
failed

to

show

any

affirmative

acts

by

Respondent

sanctioning the presence of his horse on the highway.

Roseman

Rhiness v.

Dansie, 472 P.2d 428 at 429-430.
Wherefore, Respondent Roseman respectfully requests that this
Court

affirm

the decision

of the trial

Court

dismissing

this

action.
Dated this

3c^

day of ^ T I ^ ^ , r ^ ?

1995.

i

Respectfully submit€&d,

HOLLAND
for Respondent Roseman.
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